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1 Introduction
The last decades saw an explosion in the number of academic journals. Re-
searchers find it more and more difficult to keep up with the growing literature
even in narrow fields. Libraries face higher subscription fees and must allocate
budgets in an efficient way. Promotion decisions are often taken based on re-
searchers’ publications. National organizations for scientific research steer the
course of science by funding proposals based on their potential and on the
publication record of the applicants. However, the quality of the publications,
approximated by the containing journals’ quality indicator, is becoming in-
creasingly difficult to evaluate and compare. Consequently, there is a growing
interest in finding measures, both cardinal and ordinal, that would allow for an
objective assessment. To this end, various scoring methods and ranking rules
have been devised. The former capture the cardinal aspect, by giving scores
to each journal, and the latter capture the ordinal aspect, by establishing an
order of preference among the journals.
Loosely speaking, a scoring (or ranking) problem can be thought of as a
social choice problem where a social welfare function is used to obtain total
preorders on the set of alternatives, with the additional requirement that the
set of agents and the set of alternatives coincide.1 That is, journals are asked
to express their opinions about each other and themselves. Citations made
by a journal are considered to be votes about the importance of the destina-
tion journal and a scoring method is used to aggregate the information and
determine a score for each journal. Each scoring method induces a ranking
rule.
In practice, the predominant scoring methods used for the measurement
of intellectual influence are the impact factor (Garfield, 1955), the LP method
(Liebowitz and Palmer, 1984; Laband and Piette, 1994), and the invariant
method (Pinski and Narin, 1976). The last two methods generated many vari-
ations of great practical importance. The best known is the PageRank algo-
rithm (Brin and Page, 1998), which is at the core of how search engines rank
web pages. Another variation is known as the DeGroot (1974) model, which is
used in models of learning in social and communication networks (Golub and
Jackson, 2010), physics, and computer science (Sobel, 2000).
Despite their extensive usage, these methods have only been intuitively
motivated, if at all. We are familiar with two notable exceptions which present
characterizations. Given the invariant method, Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004)
find a set of cardinal properties that fully characterize it. Given the PageRank
algorithm, Altman and Tennenholtz (2005) find a set of ordinal properties that
fully characterize it.
This paper complements the efforts made towards a better understand-
ing of scoring methods from a normative perspective. While we do not derive
a characterization of any scoring method, we formalize a property that we
1 Note that despite the fact that the models are closely related, they lead to very different
results: for example, Shoham and Leyton-Brown (2009, Proposition 9.5.1) show that Arrow’s
impossibility result holds exclusively in a social choice setting.
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call invariance to article-splitting, and with Theorem 1 we show that the im-
pact factor, the LP method, and the invariant method do not satisfy it.2 Our
result implies that there is a systematic bias common to all methods favor-
ing journals with fewer articles (or pages, or characters). While invariance to
article-splitting is a cardinal property, we show with Example 2 that if the
valuations are sufficiently biased they affect the induced ordinal ranking. For
the classification of academic journals, this bias against article-splitting has
several implications: First, whether we control for sheer size using the number
of pages or the number of articles has a profound effect on the classification re-
sults; Second, we find that quality and quantity are indistinguishable at article
level; Third, it is a direct consequence of our results that the scoring methods
presented are manipulable, and we suggest how in principle publishers or ed-
itors could artificially boost the scores of their journals. We also discuss how
our findings can reach beyond the journal setting, to settings of great practical
importance like the classification of web domains.
We then introduce modifications of all scoring methods, that are novel in
the sense that we interpret a journal as an intermediary that adds value when
converting inputs into outputs. These modifications also allow us to restore
the desirable invariance to article splitting.
In the second part of this paper, using our modified method, we provide
scores and rankings for economic journals that reflect the current trends in
the influence of economic journals.
2 Scoring Methods
Let J = {1, ..., n} denote a non-empty finite set of journals. For each i, j ∈ J ,
cij represents the number of citations to journal i by journal j, that is, the
number of references made by journal j to journal i. Let us consider a n × n
nonnegative citation matrix C = {cij}i,j∈J . Let cj =
∑
i∈J cij denote the total
number of citations made by j and let DC denote the diagonal matrix with
the elements in {cj}j∈J along the diagonal. Let the entries of the nonnegative
vector a denote the number of articles in each journal and let A be the diagonal
matrix with the elements in {aj}j∈J along the diagonal. For each vector z ∈
Rn, we denote the 1-norm of z by ||z|| =∑ni=1 |zi|.
Definition 1. A scoring problem is a triple (J, a, C) consisting of a finite set
of journals J , a vector a ∈ Nn containing the number of published articles and
a citation matrix C = {cij}i,j∈J .
Let S denote the set of scoring problems. The score for each journal in J
is given by the transposed valuations vector vT = (v1, v2, ..., vn), where vi is
interpreted as the value of a representative article in journal i.
2 Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004) were the first to introduce invariance properties for
scoring methods. However, their properties are not directly related to ours: In Step 3 of
Theorem 1 we show that the invariant method, which they characterize, does not satisfy
invariance to article-splitting.
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Definition 2. A scoring method φ maps a scoring problem (J, a, C) ∈ S to a
unique valuations vector v ∈ Rn.
A scoring method induces a weak ordering of the journals via the ranking
rule i < j if and only if for all i, j ∈ J , vi ≥ vj . Ties, i.e., i < j and j < i, are
allowed, but only occur if vi = vj .
The impact factor (Garfield, 1955) considers all citations received by an
article to have the same value and measures the direct influence that a typical
article in journal i has on all journals.
Definition 3. The impact factor gives valuations according to v that solves
A−1Ce = v (1)
where e is a vector of ones of dimension J and the matrices A and C contain
data for a two-year period.
The next two scoring methods assign different values to citations received
based on the importance of the journal that made the citation. The importance
of each journal is established endogenously and simultaneously for all journals
in each method, using convergent iterative procedures. Roughly speaking, the
LP method (Liebowitz and Palmer, 1984) gives valuations that reflect the
influence that a typical article in journal i has on journal j. The invariant
method (Pinski and Narin, 1976) is a modification of the LP method such
that the valuations given are also weighted by the reference intensity (i.e., the
average number of citations made by a typical article in j).
For a formal presentation, we need an additional assumption and some ex-
tra notation. We require the citation matrix C to be primitive3: there should
be no partition of the set of journals J in two sets J1 and J2 such that i)
there are no inter partition citations or ii) all inter partition citations are uni-
directional, say from journals in J2 to journals in J1, and we should have at
least one self-citing journal. This is a very natural and plausible assumption
for classifying journals within the same field, and from a technical perspec-
tive it ensures that the following scoring methods are well defined. Under this
assumption the iterative procedures defining the following two methods are
known to converge. We do not follow Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004) in re-
quiring the citation matrix to be only non-negative and irreducible because
Example 1 in Golub and Jackson (2010) shows that alone, these two assump-
tions do not guarantee convergence. Next, we give directly the steady-state
equations.
Definition 4. The LP method gives valuations according to v that solves
A−1Cv
||A−1Cv|| = v. (2)
3 It is well known that a sufficient condition for a matrix to be primitive is to be nonneg-
ative and irreducible with at least a positive element on the main diagonal.
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Definition 5. The invariant method gives valuations according to v that
solves
A−1CD−1C Av = v. (3)
Note that all of the scoring methods that we introduced yield a measure of
the intellectual influence per typical article published in a journal. However,
there is a considerable heterogeneity in the length of a typical article even
for journals within the same field. Some journals differ also in terms of page
size. Applied studies4 correct for this by computing scores per page or per
character, not per article.
3 Article-Splitting and Manipulability
In this section we introduce a basic desirable property of a scoring method:
invariance to article-splitting. To understand this property, consider the fol-
lowing example in which the scoring methods yield the typical influence per
page.
Example 1 (Invariance to article-splitting when scores are computed per page.)
Assume that the editorial board of a journal accepts a number of articles.
Consider two scenarios: i) the articles are published as such, or ii) for some
of the articles the authors are requested to shorten their length, by relegating
inessential details to the “web appendix”. The web appendix is available on-
line but it is not part of the printed journal, whose length is taken as input by
the scoring methods. Observe that scenario i) leads to a longer journal in terms
of pages or characters than scenario ii), and that the citations made (received)
by an article are invariant between scenarios, as typically there are no citations
made (received) on inessential details. Invariance to article-splitting requires
the score of the journal to be the same in both scenarios.
Formally, let λj ∈ R, λj > 1, be a splitting factor and consider two ranking
problems {(J, a, C), (J, a′, C)} ⊆ S where for some journal j ∈ J , a′j = λjaj
and for all other journals i 6= j, a′i = ai. Let S = (J, a, C) and S′ = (J, a′, C).
For the two problems S, S′ ∈ S defined as above, S′ is an article-split modifi-
cation of S.
Definition 6. A scoring method φ is invariant to article-splitting if for any
two problems S, S′ ∈ S such that S′ is an article-split modification of S,
φj(S) = φj(S′).
Observe that the citation matrix is not affected: the number of citations does
not change, they are only distributed among more papers. Thus, when the
scoring methods yield the typical influence of an article, our property can be
thought of as relating scoring problems in which: i) different journals have
4 See, for example, the studies of Kalaitzidakis et al (2003); Combes and Linnemer (2003);
Coupe´ (2003).
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the same citation patterns but publish a different numbers of articles, or ii)
for the same journal, the number of articles varies. The latter interpretation
simply means that if k articles with no overlapping citation published in the
same journal are merged into a single paper, then the resulting publication
collects all citations.
Next, we define a systematic deviation from invariance to article-splitting
and manipulability.
Definition 7. A scoring method φ is biased against article-splitting if for
any two problems S, S′ ∈ S such that S′ is an article-split modification of S,
φj(S) > φj(S′).
Definition 8. A scoring method φ is manipulable if a journal can increase
its valuation unilaterally.
Note that if a method is biased against article-splitting then it is manipu-
lable.
Theorem 1. The impact factor, the LP method and the invariant method are
biased against article-splitting.
Proof. Let S, S′ ∈ S be such that S′ is an article-split modification of S. We
now proceed in several (independent) steps.
Step 1: The impact factor is biased against article-splitting.
Observe that v′j =
aj
a′j
vj = 1λj vj . Hence, v
′
j < vj , and for all i 6= j, v′i = vi.
The result is independent of the fact that the impact factor is calculated for
a period of two years.
Step 2: The LP method is biased against article-splitting.
Adapting a technique introduced by Roy et al (2008), we show that an increase
in the number of articles of a journal decreases its valuation. Let Γ = A−1C
and Γ ′ = A′−1C. Then, for S and S′, the LP method gives valuations according
to vectors v and v′ that solve the following equations:
Γv = ||Γv||v, (4)
Γ ′v′ = ||Γ ′v′||v′. (5)
Equations (4) and (5) are algebraic eigenvalue problems: %(Γ ) = ||Γv||
is the spectral radius of Γ and v the eigenvector associated with %(Γ ), and
%(Γ ′) = ||Γ ′v′||, Γ ′, v′ are similar. Since the matrix Γ is primitive, Γ ′ is also
primitive and (5) is well defined. Since for all i ∈ J , a′i ≥ ai, Γ ′ is weakly
smaller in every entry than Γ . Therefore, there exists δ > 0 such that:
%(Γ ′) = %(Γ )− δ. (6)
We scale v′ such that v′j = vj and rewrite v
′T as vT = vT − xT = [v1 −
x1, ..., vj−xj , ..., vn−xn] where x ∈ Rn such that xj = 0. By (5), Γ ′v = %(Γ ′)v.
Replacing v, %(Γ ′) and using (4), we have:
Γ ′v− Γ ′x = %(Γ ′)v− %(Γ ′)x = %(Γ )v− δv− %(Γ ′)x = Γv− δv− %(Γ ′)x (7)
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Let v−j , x−j ∈ R|J−{j}|, where vi, xi > 0, be the valuation vectors except
for journal j, and let Γ−j and Γ ′−j be the matrices Γ and Γ
′ where we removed
row and column j. Note that Γ−j = Γ ′−j . Dropping the j’th equation from the
system of Equations 7, we obtain5:
Γ−jx−j = δv−j + %(Γ ′)x−j . (8)
Rearranging terms:
(%(Γ ′)I − Γ−j)x−j = −δv−j . (9)
Define N = Γ−j%(Γ ′) , and M = (I−N). Since Γ−j and %(Γ ′) are nonnegative,
N is entrywise nonnegative, i.e., N ≥ 0. Marcus and Minc (1975) show that
the spectral radius of a primitive matrix is greater than the spectral radius of
any of its submatrices. Hence, %(Γ ′) > %(Γ ′−j) = %(Γ−j). Thus, the moduli of
the eigenvalues of N < 1, and consequently lim
t→∞N
t = 0. But:
I −Nk+1 = M(I +N +N2 + · · ·+Nk). (10)
Letting k → ∞, I = M∑k=∞k=0 Nk. Premultiplying by M−1, we have
M−1 =
∑k=∞
k=0 N
k. Since N ≥ 0, M−1 ≥ 0. Observing that in (9) the vec-
tor v−j is positive, x−j has to be negative. Hence, vj = vj and for all i 6= j,
vi > vi. Rescaling v to v′, we have
v′j
v′i
<
vj
vi
. Since v′j = vj , for all i 6= j, v′i > vi.
Step 3: The invariant method is biased against article-splitting.
Observe that v′, defined as v′j =
1
λj
vj and v′i = vi for i 6= j, is the solution of:
A′−1CD−1C A
′v′ = v′. (11)
In order to see this, premultiply (3) by A, and (11) by A′. Then, note that
A′v′ = Av. Finally observe that as λj > 1, v′j < vj , while the valuations of
other journals have not changed.
Note that for the impact factor and for the invariant method the valuation
of a journal j whose articles are split into λj articles decreases by a factor of
1
λj
. For an appropriate choice of λj , the decrease can be arbitrarily low. In
particular, it can be lower than the valuation of the journal ranked next, thus
changing also the ranking of the journals. Similarly, an increase in the number
of articles of journal j decreases its relative valuation given by the LP method,
which may also affect journal j’s ranking.
The following example shows that the bias against article-splitting of the
scoring methods above may also induce changes in the ranking of the journals:
Example 2 (Article-splitting bias in scoring methods inducing changes in rank-
ings).
Let J = {j1, j2, j3}, a = (2, 2, 3), a′ = (4, 2, 3) and define C as:
5 For clarity, we detail the calculations in Appendix C.
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C =
 12 8 46 10 2
3 3 9

Let S = (J, a, C) and S′ = (J, a′, C) be two ranking problems such that
a′1 = λ1a1, with λ1 = 2. For each problem, the following table presents the
normalized vector of valuations (so that the entries add up to 1) produced by
each scoring method.
φIF (S) φIF (S′) φIM (S) φIM (S′) φLP (S) φLP (S)
j1 0.46 0.30 0.48 0.31 0.50 0.29
j2 0.35 0.45 0.33 0.44 0.37 0.51
j3 0.19 0.25 0.19 0.25 0.13 0.20
Note that all scoring methods induce the ranking j1  j2  j3 for S, and
j2  j1  j3 for S′.
Theorem 1 clearly indicates how to manipulate scoring methods. Should
the methods take as input the number of articles, then editors might opt to
implement a policy of publishing a small number of articles. If the number of
pages (or characters) is taken as input, then preference can be given to publish-
ing briefer communications. Recall Example 1. In principle, editors’ requests
of discarding inessential details by relegating them to the web appendix are
desirable, as we don’t want to waste valuable resources such as journal pages
and reader’s time for irrelevant details. However, the same requests might eas-
ily be abused to game the scoring methods. Interestingly, essentially the same
methods are used by search engines for obtaining the ranking of web pages.
The following example aims to clarify this analogy.
Example 3 (The ranking of web domains.)
A professor makes the following types of information available online: research,
teaching, and contact details. There are two natural options: i) to put all
available information on one page, each type in a separate section, or ii) to
create one distinct web page for each type.6 Search engines, like Google or Bing,
use essentially the same methods as the one used for the ranking of academic
journals: their algorithm relies on the LP-method where the left eigenvector is
computed, i.e., the weight for each page is given by the components of vector
v that solves vA
−1CT
||vA−1CT || = v, where each entry cij in the transposed matrix C
T
can be thought of as the number of links made by domain i to domain j out
of the total links made by i, and ai as the number of web pages per domain.7
By Theorem 1, it is a dominant strategy for the professor to aggregate all
information on a single page. The same technique used in Step 2 of Theorem 1
6 Note that this professor is only interested in the ranking of his domain and that the
links that his domain typically makes/receives are invariant in both cases.
7 The exact algorithms used by search engines are both a moving target and a black box,
but the characteristics to which we make the analogy to here are known to be relatively
stable (see for example Langville and Meyer (2006)).
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can be easily adapted for the left eigenvector and leads to the same qualitative
conclusions.
More generally, owners of web domains have incentives to manipulate for
economic profit: a higher placement in Google results drives more internet traf-
fic which in turn yields higher sales or advertisement revenues. Reinterpreting
Theorem 1 in this context reveals that a domain owner can improve the score
for his domain by jamming all his data on a single omniscient sheet.
4 Modified Scoring Methods
All the methods introduced in the previous section measure the typical influ-
ence of an article in i over journal j. In each method, every journal i is viewed
as an initial creator of knowledge, where the unit of knowledge created is a typ-
ical article in i. There are two important flaws with this interpretation. First,
it assumes that journals use no inputs: this approach would be suitable in a
world where each article would be 100% original and would not draw on any
pre-existing insights; even if such a world would exist, then we would have an
inconsistency because if all articles are entirely original there are no citations
made. Second, if articles can be split or merged, an article is surely not the
the most elementary building block of a journal. This problem has been previ-
ously addressed by counting journal pages, or – given that pages can be very
different in size – even characters. Mirrlees et al (2003) is an excellent survey
of empiric works that use such approaches. However, the character length is
natural to measure the length of an essay, but not papers, especially in a field
so diverse as economics.
Theorem 1 together with the discussion above are not just criticizing the
most used ranking methods, but they are also instructive about where to im-
prove. In the following, we will define modified methods that are invariant to
article-splitting. First, we view a journal as an intermediary that adds value
when converting inputs (citations made) into outputs (citations received). In-
terpreting a journal as an intermediary is new. In spirit, this idea is related to
the stream of research in the management literature that focuses on measur-
ing the value of intangible assets (for instance, human capital in a consultancy
company): since a direct measurement is impossible, the ability of these in-
tangible assets to convert inputs into outputs is often taken as proxy for their
value. Similarly, we proxy the creation of new knowledge by a journal’s abil-
ity to convert inputs into outputs. Second, we consider the smallest indivisible
unit of knowledge to be a citation. Thus, we take the number of citations made
as the footprint of an article and of a journal, and we value those articles more
that can make the most of the same borrowed knowledge. Formally, we define:
Definition 9. The modified impact factor gives valuations according to v that
solves
D−1C Ce = v (12)
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where e is a vector of ones of dimension J and the matrices DC and C contain
data for a two-year period.
Definition 10. The modified LP method gives valuations according to v that
solves
D−1C Cv
||D−1C Cv||
= v. (13)
Definition 11. The modified invariant method gives valuations according to
v that solves
D−1C CD
−1
C DCv = v. (14)
The invariant method simplifies to D−1C Cv = v. Since the matrix D
−1
C C is
normalized we have the following remark.
Remark 1 The modified invariant and modified LP methods coincide.
5 Rankings of Economic Journals
In this section we provide scores and rankings for economic journals.
5.1 Data
Our data is based on the category “Economics” in the Journal Citation Reports
(JCR) of Thompson-Reuters. We have ignored citations to and from journals
outside this category. The data is published annually with a one year lag:
edition t appears in year t + 1 and contains data about publications that
appeared in t. Our data is for the editions from 2002 to 2010.
From this data, we excluded (1) “ghost” journals, i.e., journals for which
the sum of citations made and received is at most 2, (2) “dead” journals that
do not make citations in a given year and (3) new journals, i.e., journals that
only appear in latest edition of the data. Following this approach, we obtained
a set of 224 journals that make or receive citations and that appeared in at
least two years of our data.
Notice that an article published in a journal in year t may make citations
to articles published in any year t′, t′ ≤ t. In particular, some relatively old
articles had a persistent impact, and receive an important number of citations
even many years after their publication. However, we are interested in the
current quality of economic journals. Thus, we ignore citations to old articles
as follows: for each year t ∈ {2006, . . . 2010}, we generate matrices of citations
Ct, where an entry ctij is the total number of citations made by j in year t to
articles published in i in all years t′, such that t− t′ ≤ 4. That is, to compute
the scores for 2010, we used only citations made by articles published in 2010
to articles that appeared between 2006 and 2010 inclusive.
For completeness, in Appendix B we include a description of how we for-
matted the data for input, and we provide the source code that we used for
our computations.
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5.2 The Influence of Economic Journals
In Table 1, for the top 30 journals, we present the development of the modified
invariant scores over the last 5 years. To ease the comparison, we use normal-
ized vectors: scores are given in percents. The complete table with the full set
of 224 journals is presented in Appendix A.
Table 1: Modified invariant scores (sc) and ranks (r) of economic
journals, 2006–2010.
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Journal sc r sc r sc r sc r sc r
Econometrica 6.62 1 4.94 2 5.56 2 4.13 2 4.51 1
J Polit Econ 6.31 2 12.41 1 5.59 1 4.77 1 4.17 2
Q J Econ 5.09 3 3.99 3 4.27 3 3.83 3 4.10 3
Rev Econ Stud 3.12 5 3.47 5 3.16 4 3.17 5 2.83 4
Am Econ Rev 2.62 6 3.37 6 2.83 5 3.00 7 2.81 5
J Labor Econ 2.07 10 1.77 12 2.77 6 1.79 14 2.56 6
J Financ - - - - - - 3.21 4 2.55 7
J Law Econ Organ 1.28 22 3.07 7 0.77 37 0.76 40 2.34 8
Rand J Econ 1.97 11 0.95 28 1.41 17 3.11 6 2.32 9
J Law Econ 1.28 21 3.86 4 0.50 53 0.80 38 2.24 10
Rev Econ Stat 2.35 7 2.07 9 2.51 7 1.94 13 1.95 11
Math Financ 1.12 25 0.66 41 1.37 20 0.92 30 1.89 12
J Econ Perspect 1.64 15 1.42 14 2.23 10 2.63 8 1.85 13
J Econ Theory 4.27 4 1.32 15 2.34 8 1.54 16 1.71 14
J Econometrics 1.04 27 1.01 25 0.77 36 2.01 11 1.68 15
Int J Game Theory 0.38 69 0.38 60 0.22 94 1.65 15 1.66 16
Econ Theor 1.04 28 0.94 29 1.23 23 1.50 17 1.63 17
J Financ Econ 2.30 9 1.16 20 2.34 9 2.36 9 1.59 18
Int Econ Rev 2.32 8 1.60 13 2.03 12 1.04 27 1.58 19
J Eur Econ Assoc - - 1.88 11 1.67 15 1.18 22 1.55 20
J Monetary Econ 1.68 14 0.88 32 1.12 26 1.31 21 1.54 21
Soc Choice Welfare 0.53 52 0.71 38 0.43 56 0.75 41 1.46 22
Exp Econ 0.50 53 1.11 23 0.68 41 1.09 24 1.40 23
J Bus Econ Stat 1.37 19 0.80 35 1.85 14 0.65 45 1.35 24
J Hum Resour 0.80 38 1.14 21 1.05 27 1.41 20 1.33 25
J Int Econ 1.02 30 1.10 24 0.94 31 0.90 32 1.21 26
Brookings P Eco Ac 1.11 26 0.99 26 1.88 13 1.43 19 1.19 27
J Ind Econ 1.37 18 0.91 30 0.74 39 0.90 32 1.18 28
Game Econ Behav 1.92 13 2.34 8 1.41 18 1.13 23 1.18 29
J Econ Growth 0.54 49 1.93 10 2.21 11 1.04 26 1.11 30
For the most recent results of 2010, the modified invariant method ranks
high journals such as IJGT or Social Choice and Welfare. These are rather
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formal journals that require relatively little input and are very efficient in con-
verting inputs into outputs. In contrast, the modified invariant method ranks
less high journals such as Brookings Papers on Economic Activity or the Jour-
nal of Economic Literature. These journals naturally require extensive reviews
of the literature. Given the sheer number of inputs needed, these journals are
less efficient in converting inputs into outputs.
We also note the excellent results obtained in 2010 by the Journal of Law,
Economics and Organization (JLEO). This was particularly surprising since
this journal rather falls in the category of journals that require extensive re-
views of the literature. A close inspection reveals that despite making a rela-
tively high number of citations, only a fraction of these citations are towards
other journals that are included in our dataset, i.e., an important number of
cites are to law and management journals. Thus, for our method, this jour-
nal appears to consume less information than it actually does. A similar ob-
servation applies for the Mathematical Finance (MF), a journal that has an
important fraction of citations to journals in mathematics and statistics. On
the other hand, JLEO and MF receive a lot of attention from other journals
in economics. It seems that both these journals are very efficient in converting
input from other disciplines to economics.
When we look at the trends in the intellectual influence of economic jour-
nals, while we see a slight permutation in the rankings, the top five remained
relatively stable between 2006 and 2010. The same cannot be said about all
other journals. Over the years studied, the International Journal of Game
Theory (IJGT) has made a remarkable progress, overtaking even Games and
Economic Behavior (GEB), widely considered a top journal. While one can
only speculate about the reasons of these changes, favorable editorial policies
expanding the journal’s scope into niche segments on the one side, and an
increasing competition from among others the newly launched American Eco-
nomic Journal: Microeconomics on the other, may have contributed to these
developments.
The Journal of Finance was continuously published since 1946. However,
our dataset only contains enough information to provide results for this journal
for two years. As we are unsure about why the dataset is incomplete, we are
cautious in interpreting the scores for this journal.
We also note that all scores and rankings based on eigenvector methods, ir-
respective of whether these methods are modified or unmodified, are inherently
volatile. We could reduce the volatility by increasing the difference t− t′, but
this would be against our scope of providing current, as opposed to historical,
scores. Another way to reduce the volatility would be to introduce correction
factors. If the citation matrix would have dangling nodes, i.e., journals that
only receive but do not make citations, one could introduce a correction fac-
tor that allows with some probability to “escape” from the dangling node. In
principle this technique can be extended even for matrices such as ours where
all journals make citations to smoothen out the scores. However, since there is
a trade off between introducing noise and smoothening scores, calibrating the
correction factor would be of paramount importance.
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5.3 Other Scores and Rankings
In this subsection, we discuss some other scores and rankings that are some-
times used.
Thomson Reuters publishes an impact factor score (see Definition 3) for
journals. This is the score displayed on the webpages of journals at major pub-
lishers. Research Papers in Economics (RePEc) is the largest bibliographical
database in Economics, covering most journals and working papers. RePEc
provides a number of alternative scores based on a time unrestricted impact
factor (Zimmermann, 2007).
Recall that for the impact factor, there is no distinction if a citation is
received from a prestigious journal or from a mediocre one, i.e., all citations
have equal weight. Furthermore, the impact factor is just an average. It is
known to vary greatly across and even within fields due to, for instance, differ-
ences in citation habits and field size (Jemec, 2001). Moreover, it is so easily
manipulable that in 2007, as a form of protest against it’s usage, the editorial
board of a medical journal agreed to publish one article that alone boosted
it’s impact factor from 0.66 to 1.44 (Opa´trny´, 2008). Despite this protest, in
2008, the journal Acta Crystallographica Section A ranked second in Thomson
Reuter’s science category, ahead of journals such as Nature or Science, after
publishing one article in which the authors suggested that their work can be
used as a general reference for an emerging field. Overall, the limitations by
definition and the forms of potential and real manipulation (Smith, 1997) make
the impact factor a very unreliable indicator of quality.
Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004) characterized the invariant method and
provided rankings of economic journals using different methods. In their rank-
ings, Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004) used a subset of 37 journals and in
their Ct matrix they allowed for any t′ such that t − t′ ≤ 6. However, note
that Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004) are only interested in illustrating the
differences between the methods they consider. Thus, for simplicity and to
ease the computations, it was natural for them to restrict their attention to a
small arbitrary subset of journals. Their results are not meant to reflect the
intellectual influence of economic journals.
The EigenFactor (Bergstrom, 2007; Bergstrom et al, 2008) and the SCImago
(Gonza´lez-Pereira et al, 2009) are two independent projects that are worth
mentioning as real contributions towards the understanding of the influence of
journals. Based on data from Thomson Reuters and Elsevier’s Scopus respec-
tively8, both projects essentially use fine-tuned invariant methods to obtain
scores and rankings for journals. Despite the fact that the methodology in
both projects is subject to the same critiques as the invariant method, these
projects represent a major improvement over the impact factor.
8 Unfortunately, for the time being, metrics based on automatically identified citations
using Google Scholar or RePEc just add one more layer of uncertainty, namely collecting
genuine citations.
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Finally, we note that the tournament method (Ko´czy and Strobel, 2010)
is invariant to article-splitting by definition, and that for the h index (Hirsch,
2004; Braun et al, 2006) article splitting has an ambiguous effect.
6 Conclusion
This paper is part of a broader program that aims at the better understanding
of scoring methods. Ko´czy and Strobel (2008) have shown that adding unnec-
essary citations may be a means of manipulation, here we look at an issue of
journal design: the length of the articles.
First, we introduced and formalized a desirable property and we derived
analytically that the popular methods for ranking academic journals are in-
herently biased. For journals with similar citation patterns, the journals pub-
lishing fewer articles are privileged to the ones publishing more articles. If we
account for the length of a journal based on the number of pages or char-
acters, then the current scoring methods give extra credit to shorter more
formal journals and punish those that make an effort of keeping good English
in their articles. Thus, the currently most used scoring methods share a com-
mon drawback: they cannot distinguish quality from quantity at article level.
Furthermore, observe that for a journal with relatively numerous articles but
few pages, measuring its influence by taking the number of pages or articles as
input will make a crucial difference. One must therefore use and interpret the
valuations and the induced rankings with care when estimating the quality of
journals and articles.
A direct consequence of our theoretical results is that the current methods
for measuring influence are manipulable, and that strategies that increase the
payoffs are relatively easy to infer and implement. This is a concern for the
evaluation of research and in closely related settings like raking web domains.
An interesting open question is to quantify the incentive to manipulate by con-
sidering the maximum number of ranks someone can gain in their preference
ordering by manipulation or the number of ranks someone else can lose due
to manipulation, as it has recently been done by (Campbell and Kelly, 2009,
2010) for social choice settings.
Second, we introduced a modification of the current scoring methods which
renders them immune to the bias and which, as opposed to other modifica-
tions suggested in the earlier literature, still preserves the notion of value at
article level. This modification has also a novel interpretation, and it is more
appropriate for measuring the creation of knowledge.
Third, using our modified invariant method, we have conducted a world-
wide ranking of journals in economics, over the period 2006-2010.
Appendix
A The complete ranking of economics journals
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Table 2: Modified invariant scores (sc) and ranks (r) of economic journals,
2006–2010.
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Journal sc r sc r sc r sc r sc r
Econometrica 6.62 1 4.94 2 5.56 2 4.13 2 4.51 1
J Polit Econ 6.31 2 12.41 1 5.59 1 4.77 1 4.17 2
Q J Econ 5.09 3 3.99 3 4.27 3 3.83 3 4.10 3
Rev Econ Stud 3.12 5 3.47 5 3.16 4 3.17 5 2.83 4
Am Econ Rev 2.62 6 3.37 6 2.83 5 3.00 7 2.81 5
J Labor Econ 2.07 10 1.77 12 2.77 6 1.79 14 2.56 6
J Financ - - - - - - 3.21 4 2.55 7
J Law Econ Organ 1.28 22 3.07 7 0.77 37 0.76 40 2.34 8
Rand J Econ 1.97 11 0.95 28 1.41 17 3.11 6 2.32 9
J Law Econ 1.28 21 3.86 4 0.50 53 0.80 38 2.24 10
Rev Econ Stat 2.35 7 2.07 9 2.51 7 1.94 13 1.95 11
Math Financ 1.12 25 0.66 41 1.37 20 0.92 30 1.89 12
J Econ Perspect 1.64 15 1.42 14 2.23 10 2.63 8 1.85 13
J Econ Theory 4.27 4 1.32 15 2.34 8 1.54 16 1.71 14
J Econometrics 1.04 27 1.01 25 0.77 36 2.01 11 1.68 15
Int J Game Theory 0.38 69 0.38 60 0.22 94 1.65 15 1.66 16
Econ Theor 1.04 28 0.94 29 1.23 23 1.50 17 1.63 17
J Financ Econ 2.30 9 1.16 20 2.34 9 2.36 9 1.59 18
Int Econ Rev 2.32 8 1.60 13 2.03 12 1.04 27 1.58 19
J Eur Econ Assoc - - 1.88 11 1.67 15 1.18 22 1.55 20
J Monetary Econ 1.68 14 0.88 32 1.12 26 1.31 21 1.54 21
Soc Choice Welfare 0.53 52 0.71 38 0.43 56 0.75 41 1.46 22
Exp Econ 0.50 53 1.11 23 0.68 41 1.09 24 1.40 23
J Bus Econ Stat 1.37 19 0.80 35 1.85 14 0.65 45 1.35 24
J Hum Resour 0.80 38 1.14 21 1.05 27 1.41 20 1.33 25
J Int Econ 1.02 30 1.10 24 0.94 31 0.90 32 1.21 26
Brookings P Econ Ac 1.11 26 0.99 26 1.88 13 1.43 19 1.19 27
J Ind Econ 1.37 18 0.91 30 0.74 39 0.90 32 1.18 28
Game Econ Behav 1.92 13 2.34 8 1.41 18 1.13 23 1.18 29
J Econ Growth 0.54 49 1.93 10 2.21 11 1.04 26 1.11 30
Economet Theor 1.01 32 1.13 22 1.02 28 0.93 29 1.09 31
Economica 0.67 43 0.35 64 0.30 75 0.53 55 0.97 32
Econ Philos 1.03 29 0.15 102 0.05 167 0.08 156 0.93 33
J Public Econ 1.19 23 1.18 19 0.88 32 0.80 37 0.90 34
IMF Staff Papers 0.23 84 0.34 67 0.60 48 0.12 128 0.88 35
Econ J 1.30 20 0.82 34 0.95 30 0.88 33 0.87 36
J Financ Economet - - - - - - 1.03 28 0.83 37
Rev Econ Dynam 1.38 17 1.31 16 1.38 19 1.97 12 0.82 38
Economet Rev - - 0.33 68 0.74 39 2.29 10 0.79 39
J Dev Econ 0.67 44 0.79 36 1.18 25 0.72 43 0.73 40
Economet J - - 0.62 43 0.34 71 0.26 79 0.71 41
J Econ Lit 1.39 16 1.18 19 1.35 21 0.56 53 0.71 42
J Money Credit Bank 0.37 71 0.38 58 1.23 22 0.70 44 0.70 43
Quant Mark Econ - - - - 0.43 55 0.08 154 0.66 44
J Appl Economet - - - - - - 0.85 36 0.65 45
J Account Econ 1.93 12 0.97 27 0.77 35 1.43 19 0.65 46
J Econ Hist 0.63 46 1.25 17 1.62 16 0.74 42 0.64 47
J Econ Manage Strat 0.87 35 0.51 49 0.66 44 0.34 67 0.64 48
Int J Ind Organ 0.59 48 0.37 61 0.45 54 0.87 34 0.62 49
Eur Econ Rev 0.85 37 0.54 47 0.82 34 0.64 47 0.62 50
J Urban Econ 0.71 42 0.74 37 0.32 74 0.77 39 0.57 51
Econ Policy 0.44 62 0.31 71 0.58 51 0.35 65 0.56 52
...
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Table 2 – continued from previous page
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Journal sc r sc r sc r sc r sc r
J Financ Quant Anal 1.02 31 0.85 33 0.98 29 0.87 35 0.50 54
Econ Hist Rev 0.32 75 0.17 95 0.59 49 0.34 69 0.50 54
Theor Decis 0.21 85 0.24 77 0.32 73 1.05 25 0.50 55
Econ Inq 0.45 61 0.62 43 0.70 40 0.57 51 0.49 56
Econ Dev Cult Change 0.13 108 0.43 54 0.40 62 0.43 61 0.47 57
Econ Lett 0.61 47 0.67 39 0.34 69 0.60 48 0.46 58
J Risk Uncertainty 0.87 34 0.53 48 0.66 43 0.39 62 0.46 59
J Health Econ 0.54 51 0.35 65 0.42 59 0.34 66 0.45 60
Scand J Econ 0.77 40 0.43 53 0.65 45 0.25 82 0.42 61
J Env Econ Manag 0.48 56 0.48 51 0.36 66 0.34 69 0.41 62
J Econ Educ 0.18 93 0.06 147 0.38 64 0.07 163 0.39 63
Public Choice 0.25 81 0.22 81 0.28 80 0.19 99 0.39 64
Can J Econ 0.33 73 0.23 78 0.29 77 0.27 75 0.37 65
J Math Econ 0.77 39 0.60 45 0.63 47 0.58 50 0.34 66
World Bank Econ Rev 0.26 77 0.60 44 0.55 52 0.56 54 0.34 67
J Econ Behav Organ 0.50 54 0.89 31 0.40 63 0.38 63 0.33 68
Econ Educ Rev 0.49 55 0.32 70 0.59 50 0.24 84 0.33 69
J Risk Insur 0.26 79 0.23 79 0.17 100 0.17 103 0.32 70
Explor Econ Hist 0.40 64 0.40 57 1.21 24 0.13 121 0.31 71
J Jpn Int Econ 0.08 123 0.21 85 0.16 105 0.11 133 0.30 72
J Public Econ Theory - - - - - - 0.25 81 0.30 73
Oxford B Econ Stat 0.19 89 0.36 63 0.32 72 0.49 58 0.29 74
Econ Soc 0.18 91 0.10 123 0.06 146 0.10 137 0.29 75
J Policy Anal Manag - - 0.08 131 0.28 79 0.29 73 0.28 77
Indep Rev - - 0.10 121 0.09 135 0.01 209 0.28 77
J Econ Dyn Control 0.48 58 0.41 56 0.34 70 0.45 59 0.28 78
Eur Rev Econ Hist - - - - - - 0.26 78 0.27 79
Rev Env Econ Policy - - - - - - 0.04 185 0.27 80
Macroecon Dyn 0.36 72 0.32 69 0.28 81 0.13 125 0.25 81
Econ J Watch - - - - - - 0.04 182 0.24 82
Fisc Stud 0.14 102 0.04 160 0.10 131 0.23 91 0.24 83
Natl Tax J 0.86 36 0.18 89 0.64 46 0.29 74 0.24 84
Quant Financ 0.64 45 0.31 72 0.17 101 0.18 101 0.23 85
J Popul Econ 0.26 78 0.38 59 0.41 61 0.65 46 0.23 86
J Transp Econ Policy 0.11 116 0.27 74 0.16 104 0.60 49 0.22 87
Fem Econ 0.06 131 0.05 150 0.01 183 0.09 149 0.22 89
Oxford Econ Pap 0.47 60 0.49 50 0.87 33 0.24 89 0.22 89
Int Tax Public Finan 0.48 57 0.29 73 0.27 82 0.24 86 0.22 90
Reg Sci Urban Econ 0.15 99 0.46 52 0.37 65 0.16 107 0.21 91
J Econ Geogr 0.40 67 0.09 128 0.24 89 0.16 108 0.21 92
Labour Econ 0.43 63 0.34 66 0.21 95 0.31 72 0.21 93
Real Estate Econ 1.15 24 0.04 157 0.17 103 0.36 64 0.20 95
South Econ J 0.16 96 0.18 90 0.25 87 0.16 107 0.20 95
Small Bus Econ 0.06 134 0.21 84 0.08 139 0.10 141 0.19 96
Am J Agr Econ 0.13 103 0.22 83 0.24 92 0.15 113 0.19 97
J Macroecon 0.12 115 0.08 133 0.09 137 0.11 131 0.19 98
Econ Dev Q 0.03 148 0.67 40 0.00 194 0.04 184 0.19 99
Rev Dev Econ - - 0.11 120 0.13 114 0.21 94 0.17 100
J Real Estate Financ 0.48 59 0.07 138 0.21 96 0.15 111 0.17 102
Health Econ 0.19 90 0.13 111 0.41 60 0.27 76 0.17 102
Am J Econ Sociol 0.01 153 0.15 103 0.08 142 0.19 98 0.17 103
Int J Forecasting 0.40 66 0.12 114 0.11 123 0.09 145 0.16 104
Oxford Rev Econ Pol 0.15 99 0.22 80 0.23 93 0.15 109 0.16 105
Jpn Econ Rev 0.08 124 0.20 87 0.35 68 0.02 194 0.16 106
...
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Table 2 – continued from previous page
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Journal sc r sc r sc r sc r sc r
Fed Reserve Bank St - - - - 0.43 57 0.22 93 0.15 107
Appl Econ 0.05 135 0.10 124 0.13 117 0.13 121 0.15 108
Jpn World Econ 0.17 94 0.24 76 0.05 167 0.02 201 0.15 111
Empir Econ - - 0.13 109 0.13 112 0.13 124 0.15 111
J Econ Psychol 0.38 70 0.16 99 0.17 99 0.11 132 0.15 111
J Comp Econ 0.12 113 0.18 93 0.18 98 0.11 135 0.15 114
Int Rev Law Econ 0.96 33 0.08 136 0.16 106 0.17 104 0.15 114
Camb J Econ - - 0.12 117 0.08 141 0.06 167 0.15 114
J Prod Anal 0.24 82 0.16 98 0.17 102 0.14 117 0.15 115
Astin Bull - - 0.08 135 0.12 118 0.26 77 0.15 117
World Dev 0.12 110 0.12 116 0.15 107 0.12 129 0.15 117
J Common Mark S 0.08 122 0.43 55 0.35 67 0.05 178 0.14 118
Insur Math Econ 0.40 66 0.13 109 0.13 117 0.15 110 0.14 119
J Bank Financ 0.20 86 0.20 86 0.24 91 0.18 100 0.13 120
J Regul Econ 0.54 50 0.09 127 0.29 76 0.45 60 0.13 121
Rev Income Wealth 0.33 74 0.18 91 0.42 58 0.24 88 0.13 122
Energ J 0.13 104 0.16 98 0.24 90 0.56 53 0.13 123
Stud Nonlinear Dyn E 0.32 76 0.13 112 0.05 167 0.09 147 0.12 124
Be J Macroecon - - - - - - 0.07 163 0.12 125
World Bank Res Obser 0.13 107 0.55 46 0.26 84 0.04 179 0.12 126
Land Econ 0.26 80 0.22 82 0.18 97 0.23 90 0.11 128
Rev Ind Organ 0.16 97 0.36 63 0.06 149 0.22 92 0.11 128
World Econ 0.13 107 0.14 107 0.25 88 0.17 103 0.11 130
Agr Econ-Blackwell - - 0.04 155 0.09 138 0.05 177 0.11 130
Ger Econ Rev - - - - - - 0.05 176 0.11 131
Pac Econ Rev - - 0.02 166 0.04 173 0.03 193 0.11 132
Pharmacoeconomics - - - - - - 0.03 190 0.11 133
Be J Econ Anal Poli - - - - - - 0.13 123 0.11 134
J Evol Econ 0.11 117 0.17 94 0.12 120 0.09 146 0.10 136
J Econ Issues 0.01 155 0.04 155 0.03 175 0.01 209 0.10 136
Value Health - - - - - - 0.01 205 0.10 137
Europe-Asia Stud 0.02 151 0.17 96 0.00 188 0.01 211 0.09 138
Aust Econ Hist Rev - - - - 0.66 42 0.51 57 0.09 140
Rev World Econ 0.00 158 0.07 142 0.10 127 0.14 117 0.09 140
Environ Resour Econ 0.19 88 0.12 116 0.12 119 0.20 96 0.09 142
Contemp Econ Policy 0.06 129 0.12 113 0.09 133 0.15 112 0.09 142
J Inst Theor Econ 0.19 88 0.09 125 0.26 85 0.34 70 0.08 143
Economist-Netherland 0.06 132 0.01 169 0.06 152 0.04 182 0.08 146
Scot J Polit Econ 0.23 83 0.10 123 0.05 159 0.13 122 0.08 146
J Forest Econ - - 0.04 161 0.05 159 0.10 140 0.08 146
J Afr Econ 0.04 139 0.05 152 0.09 137 0.12 128 0.08 147
Resour Energy Econ 0.14 101 0.26 75 0.09 133 0.25 83 0.08 148
Cesifo Econ Stud - - 0.04 157 0.05 167 0.07 157 0.08 149
Asian Econ Policy R - - - - - - 0.03 187 0.07 150
J Sport Econ - - - - - - 0.21 95 0.07 151
Ecol Econ 0.04 141 0.05 153 0.06 149 0.11 134 0.07 152
Eur Rev Agric Econ 0.03 146 0.03 164 0.06 153 0.05 174 0.07 153
J Policy Model 0.05 138 0.08 133 0.04 169 0.09 152 0.06 155
J Dev Stud 0.12 113 0.19 88 0.11 124 0.14 114 0.06 155
Econ Transit 0.08 126 0.13 111 0.14 109 0.14 118 0.06 159
Kyklos 0.07 127 0.14 105 0.12 121 0.07 159 0.06 159
Econ Rec 0.09 121 0.06 144 0.08 141 0.10 136 0.06 159
Aust J Agr Resour Ec 0.03 142 0.09 127 0.07 143 0.09 144 0.06 159
J Cult Econ - - - - - - 0.06 170 0.06 161
...
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Table 2 – continued from previous page
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Journal sc r sc r sc r sc r sc r
Eur J Health Econ - - - - - - 0.07 159 0.06 161
Finanzarchiv - - - - 0.14 109 0.05 174 0.06 164
Econ Hum Biol - - - - 0.28 78 0.10 140 0.06 164
Energ Econ 0.18 93 0.18 92 0.05 162 0.19 97 0.06 164
J Econ 0.39 68 0.08 131 0.25 86 0.09 149 0.06 167
Inf Econ Policy 0.13 107 0.05 150 0.13 117 0.51 56 0.06 167
Appl Econ Lett 0.06 130 0.07 139 0.10 131 0.10 142 0.06 167
J Real Estate Res - - - - 0.06 155 0.09 152 0.05 168
J Agr Resour Econ 0.04 140 0.06 148 0.06 145 0.08 155 0.05 171
Mar Resour Econ - - - - - - 0.10 138 0.05 171
Hist Polit Econ - - - - 0.04 170 0.07 160 0.05 171
J Econ Surv 0.06 129 0.12 118 0.14 111 0.12 130 0.05 172
J Hous Econ 0.72 41 0.06 146 0.14 110 0.05 174 0.05 173
Be J Theor Econ - - - - - - 0.24 88 0.05 175
J Int Trade Econ Dev - - - - - - 0.05 176 0.05 175
Food Policy 0.03 144 0.07 142 0.06 147 0.07 161 0.05 176
J Agr Econ 0.05 136 0.02 167 0.06 152 0.04 184 0.05 177
Manch Sch 0.14 100 0.15 100 0.07 144 0.16 105 0.04 178
Work Employ Soc 0.00 158 0.01 171 0.04 172 0.06 168 0.04 179
Asian Econ J - - - - - - 0.05 171 0.04 181
Can J Agr Econ - - - - 0.05 156 0.06 166 0.04 181
J Regional Sci - - 0.14 104 0.10 129 0.14 119 0.04 182
Dev Econ 0.01 156 0.07 142 0.02 181 0.01 212 0.04 183
Int J Transp Econ - - 0.08 137 0.00 194 0.00 224 0.04 184
Open Econ Rev 0.12 114 0.01 169 0.09 135 0.09 152 0.04 185
Econ Model 0.10 118 0.08 135 0.05 168 0.02 199 0.03 187
Ind Corp Change 0.17 95 0.04 160 0.13 113 0.09 143 0.03 187
S Afr J Econ 0.06 134 0.01 172 0.04 171 0.02 196 0.03 188
Int Financ - - - - - - 0.25 81 0.03 191
Jahrb Natl Stat 0.01 154 - - 0.02 180 0.01 213 0.03 191
Rev Int Polit Econ 0.12 110 0.08 129 0.27 83 0.06 166 0.03 191
J Post Keynesian Ec 0.05 137 0.06 145 0.05 157 0.04 186 0.03 192
J Media Econ 0.00 162 0.00 179 0.00 188 0.03 191 0.03 194
China Econ Rev 0.08 125 0.11 120 0.05 162 0.02 195 0.03 194
Econ Geogr 0.12 111 0.05 152 0.11 122 0.03 192 0.02 195
Aust Econ Pap - - - - - - 0.06 170 0.02 196
New Polit Econ 0.03 149 0.04 158 0.05 162 0.01 204 0.02 197
Emerg Mark Financ Tr 0.02 152 0.01 174 0.10 128 0.02 203 0.02 199
Post-Sov Aff 0.03 145 0.14 106 0.01 182 0.01 210 0.02 199
Aust Econ Rev - - - - 0.03 178 0.06 166 0.02 200
China World Econ - - - - 0.00 189 0.02 200 0.02 202
Futures 0.03 148 0.07 143 0.10 127 0.02 203 0.02 202
Eur J Hist Econ Thou - - 0.03 164 0.03 175 0.32 71 0.01 204
Tijdschr Econ Soc Ge 0.09 120 0.03 165 0.10 125 0.03 189 0.01 204
J Agrar Change - - - - 0.05 167 0.24 85 0.01 206
J Appl Econ - - 0.01 173 0.03 176 0.12 126 0.01 206
J Asia Pac Econ - - - - - - 0.03 189 0.01 207
Asian-Pac Econ Lit - - - - - - 0.04 182 0.01 210
Defence Peace Econ 0.09 119 0.15 101 0.06 154 0.08 153 0.01 210
Port Econ J - - 0.01 170 0.03 178 0.14 117 0.01 210
Post-Communist Econ 0.00 159 0.03 162 0.01 186 0.02 199 0.00 211
Eastern Eur Econ 0.03 143 0.01 175 0.02 180 0.01 209 0.00 213
Singap Econ Rev - - - - - - 0.02 199 0.00 213
Cepal Rev - - - - - - 0.01 209 0.00 224
...
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Table 2 – continued from previous page
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Journal sc r sc r sc r sc r sc r
Ekon Cas 0.00 160 - - 0.00 194 0.00 224 0.00 224
Invest Econ-Mex - - - - - - 0.01 214 0.00 224
J Bus Econ Manag - - - - - - 0.00 224 0.00 224
Polit Ekon 0.02 150 0.00 179 0.00 190 0.00 224 0.00 224
Rev Econ Apl-Spain - - - - 0.06 152 0.00 216 0.00 224
Rev Econ Mund - - - - - - 0.00 224 0.00 224
Rev Econ Polit - - 0.00 179 0.00 194 0.00 224 0.00 224
S Afr J Econ Manag S - - - - 0.01 186 0.00 217 0.00 224
Transform Bus Econ - - - - - - 0.00 224 0.00 224
Trimest Econ 0.00 162 0.00 179 0.01 184 0.00 215 0.00 224
B Data Format and Source Code
We organized the data in three types of files:
– the m file – in this file, for each year t, there is a spreadsheet containing the citation
matrix Ct where an entry in row i, column j is the total number of cites made in year
t by articles in journal j to articles in journal i no older than 4 years;
– the a file – in this file, for each year t, there is a spreadsheet containing a column with
the number of articles a published by each journal in that year;
– the c file – in this file, for each year t, there is a spreadsheet containing a column with
the total number of citations cj made by journal j to articles in journals in J no older
than 4 years.
To obtain the raw ranking vectors from the above matrices, we used the following code in
Wolfram Mathematica 8.0:
LP = {Null, Null, Null, Null, Null};
Inv = {Null, Null, Null, Null, Null};
ModInv = {Null, Null, Null, Null, Null};
For[i = 1, i <= 5, i++;
Cnow = Import["data/m.xls"][[i]];
Anow = DiagonalMatrix[Transpose[Import["data/a.xls"][[i]] ][[1]]];
DCnow = DiagonalMatrix[Transpose[Import["data/c.xls"][[i]] ][[1]]];
LP[[i]] = Eigenvectors[Inverse[Anow].Cnow][[1]];
Inv[[i]] = Eigenvectors[Inverse[Anow].Cnow.Inverse[DCnow].Anow][[1]];
ModInv[[i]] = Eigenvectors[Inverse[DCnow].Cnow][[1]]];
Export["lp.xls", LP];
Export["inv.xls", Inv];
Export["modinv.xls", ModInv]
The diagonal matrices A and DC are generated by our code from the data files. Each year
we have a different set of journals: for each year the raw score vectors are copied next to the
lists of journals and are normalized. The overall ranking is produced by sorting the journals
according to their scores.
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C Detailed Calculations
Writing Equality 7 in detail for the left most and right most terms of the equality, we obtain
the following system of equations:8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
1
a1
[(v1c11 + · · ·+ vnc1n)− (x1c11 + · · ·+ xj−1c1j−1 + xj+1c1j+1 + · · ·+ xnc1n)] =
= 1
a1
(v1c11 + · · ·+ vnc1n)− δv1 − %(Γ ′)x1
...
1
a′j
[(v1cj1 + · · ·+ vncjn)− (x1cj1 + · · ·+ xj−1cjj−1 + xj+1cjj+1 + · · ·+ xncjn)] =
= 1
aj
(v1cj1 + · · ·+ vncjn)− δvj − %(Γ ′)xj
...
1
an
[(v1cn1 + · · ·+ vncnn)− (x1cn1 + · · ·+ xj−1cnj−1 + xj+1cnj+1 + · · ·+ xncnn)] =
= 1
an
(v1cn1 + · · ·+ vncnn)− δvn − %(Γ ′)xn
After canceling terms and dropping the j’th row from the system of equations above,
we obtain:8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1
a1
(x1c11 + · · ·+ xj−1c1j−1 + xj+1c1j+1 + · · ·+ xnc1n) = δv1 + %(Γ ′)x1
...
1
aj−1
(x1cj−11 + · · ·+ xj−1cj−1j−1 + xj+1cj−1j+1 + · · ·+ xncj−1n) = δvj−1 + %(Γ ′)xj−1
1
aj+1
(x1cj+11 + · · ·+ xj−1cj+1j−1 + xj+1cj+1j+1 + · · ·+ xncj+1n) = δvj+1 + %(Γ ′)xj+1
...
1
an
(x1cn1 + · · ·+ xj−1cnj−1 + xj+1cnj+1 + · · ·+ xncnn) = δvn + %(Γ ′)xn
Rewriting the above system of equations using vector and matrix notation yields Equation 8.
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